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Résumé : Ce qui semble à première vue paradoxal,  la rationalité de la per-
formance , fait référence à une capacité extraordinaire des êtres humains, à sa-
voir la compétence-en-performance qui leur permet d'aronter les vicissitudes
de la vie et de négocier leurs buts et intérêts dans une interaction dialogique
avec leurs semblables. Le concept de  rationalité de la performance  exige de
passer d'une rationalité logique à une rationalité adaptative qui puisse saisir
les activités changeantes et les incertitudes de la vie. Accepter ce concept sup-
pose de changer notre mode de théorisation, d'un mode classique à un mode
moderne, c'est-à-dire de passer du réductionnisme au holisme. Cet article in-
troduit le Mixed Game Model et expose les éléments fondamentaux d'une telle
théorie holistique qui place les êtres humains au centre et qui décrit leurs
actions et comportements à l'aide des principes des probabilités.
Abstract: What at rst sight seems paradoxical, rationality of performance,
refers to an extraordinary ability that human beings have, namely to their
competence-in-performance that enables them to meet the vicissitudes of life
and to negotiate their interests and purposes in dialogic interaction with their
fellow beings. The concept of rationality of performance requires a change
from a logical rationality to an adaptive rationality, which can come to grips
with ever-changing activities and the uncertainties of life. To accept such a
concept means changing our way of theorizing from the classical to a modern
way of theorizing, i.e., moving from reductionism to holism. This paper intro-
duces the Mixed Game Model and outlines basic elements of such a holistic
theory that puts human beings at its centre and describes their actions and
behaviour by means of principles of probability.
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1 The issue
To speak of rationality of performance seems to be paradoxical, at least re-
garding the way rationality has been conceived of for ages. How could rational-
ity in the traditional sense of logical conclusiveness be related to performance?
Performance relates to so-called reality or to what is going on in life. Life is
complex, reality seems to be chaotic. Nonetheless there seems to be some
order in chaos, which Prigogine, though referring to biochemistry, concisely
called  les lois du chaos [Prigogine 1994]. Rationality of performance means
 les lois du chaos which human beings are obviously capable of applying when
facing the challenge of life. Whereas rationality of logic means certainty, ratio-
nality of performance means tackling the uncertainties of life [Toulmin 2001].
Einstein commented on this issue with his well-known phrase:
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.
[Einstein 1922, 28]
In the same way as we have left behind us the certain laws of mathematics,
the time has now come to leave behind us our belief in certainty and strict
rationality. The traditional Western concept of rationality needs to be changed
in essence, needs to become some sort of higher rationality if it is to comply
with performance.
There is however a great deal of resistance among scientists to giving up
the traditional concept of a theory based on strict rationality. Even if Searle
opposes the classical model of rationality, his own concept of rationality in
action as a universal, culture-independent concept, is no less articial as it is
entirely constructed according to his rules of a competence theory of speech
acts [Searle 2001]. Admittedly, there are regularities in performance but they
are not the ultimate ratio. They are dominated by the overall law of perfor-
mance which is a law of probability and chance. Traditional theorizing fails
to do justice to the relativity of rules in performance and instead constructs
its object-of-study articially by starting from methodological exigencies. The
meaning and purpose of science are in jeopardy if they are based on such ar-
ticial games. There is no way out of this dilemma other than to accept the
complex as our starting point and to try to make sense of what might be the
structure of complexity.
The laws of chaos do not mean guessing by trial and error but adapting
to ever-changing surroundings. Simon proposed the term bounded rational-
ity which is sometimes used in the literature [Simon 1983]. It does not seem
quite adequate to me because we do not want to delimit rationality but to
open it up so that it becomes capable of tackling performance. Rationality of
performance is then no longer a paradox but precisely what reality demands,
insofar as there is reality at all. Rationality of performance is the central
component of what I called competence-in-performance, an extraordinary hu-
man ability which enables us to meet the vicissitudes of life and to negotiate
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our interests and purposes in dialogue with our fellow beings. Dialogic activi-
ties have goals and purposes. They are actions and reactions among dierent
human beings who might have dierent individual purposes. Understanding
cannot be presupposed. Consequently, dialogue means negotiating meaning
and understanding in order to arrive at an agreement. The concept of ratio-
nality in performance requires a change from logical rationality to an adaptive
rationality which can come to grips with ever-changing conditions and the
uncertainty of life.
Whereas such a change in theorizing from a rule-governed, logical model
to a model that allows for adaptation comes as a break in modern linguistics,
the concept of adaptation has been a constitutive component in cognitive and
evolutionary psychology in recent decades. For instance, Hugo Mercier &
Dan Sperber argue for rethinking the function of reasoning and suggest an
adaptive concept [Mercier & Sperber 2011]. Evolutionary psychologists, for
instance, Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, consider the human mind as adapted
mind [Barkow, Cosmides et al. 1992]. Psychological mechanisms which have
evolved since the time of Pleistocene hunter-gatherers are considered to be
adaptations created by natural selection over evolutionary time in order to
face changing conditions of life.
Recently an article appeared by Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch which demon-
strates that the search for justication by evolutionary psychology and neu-
roscience also applies to supporters of the old Chomskyan hypotheses about
language [Hauser, Chomsky et al. 2002]. The article repeats the position
Chomsky took ve decades ago: language is a recursive system which is in-
nate. The only concession the Chomskyan line is prepared to make refers
to the fact that language as a recursive system or language in the narrow
sense is now conceived of as interacting with language in the broad sense
or language as a communicative system. However, how should this inter-
action be achieved if both systems of language are dened as independent
systems? Complexity is not based on the addition of independent parts but
on integrated components derived from the complex whole. The article at-
tempts to justify its articial construction of language by the hypothesis that
we are born with genes that determine a rather precise universal grammar of
the recursive type. The argumentation for this rather unlikely thesis is com-
pletely based on speculation, only referring to seeming authorities, without any
substantial argument or experimental proof. The authors do not hesitate to
explicitly mark their assumptions as hypotheses or suggestions (see also
[Weigand 2007, 29 .]).
There are many other voices we might refer to in order to demonstrate that
science is going to include concepts such as adaptation and open-endedness of
language use in theoretical approaches. However, to accept such a concept
of rationality-in-performance means changing theorizing from classical theo-
rizing to modern theorizing, from constructing our object by methodology to
deriving methodology from the complex object of performance. Physics al-
ready underwent such a change decades ago when classical physics changed
250 Edda Weigand
to modern physics. What is at stake is a change from reductionism to holism
if we want to describe and explain  les lois du chaos. Performance cannot
be reduced to rules but includes chance and ever-changing action conditions.
Human beings take account of rules as far as they go and orient themselves
towards probabilities where rules come to an end. A theory of performance
must therefore inevitably be based on Principles of Probability. The terms
probability or chaos do not refer to statistics and measurements of calcu-
lating probability but to the common sense of human beings who know that
life is a matter of probability ranging from complete unpredictability or chance
to events which can be expected with rather high probability.
2 The challenge of complexity in general
Simon made an interesting proposal about the architecture of complexity
in general which conforms with recent results in the neurosciences [Simon
1962]. To my mind, we are happy insofar as we are eventually able to open
up the black box and to see, at least to some extent, how it works. The
classical period of an independent philosophy is over. According to Lumsden
and Wilson, it needs
intensied dialogue among the arts, humanities, and sciences of
human nature. [...] A substantive familiarity with science, in-
cluding especially evolutionary science, is once again de rigueur
for respectable philosophy of mind. [Lumsden & Wilson 2005,
xIvi]
Assertions about human actions and behaviour need to be justied by human
nature and proved by biology and neuroscience.
The theory I have developed in recent years according to such guidelines
(cf. [Weigand 2010], [Trognon 2013]) starts with goal-oriented observation
[Feynman 2001]. Simple observation, i.e., restriction to the empirical level, will
not suce. We need some sort of question or scientic interest which guides our
observation. By focusing on our own behaviour we can, for instance, observe
that we not only take decisions by means of reasonable arguments but are also
more or less aected by emotion. This interdependence of reason and emotion
or Descartes' error has nally been proved by neurological experiments, e.g.,
[Damasio 1994, 2000]. Human abilities are integrated and interact with each
other, which has been demonstrated, for instance, by Kendon's research on the
integration of language and gesture, e.g., [Kendon 1980] or McNeill's research
on the integration of thought and gesture [McNeill 2005].
The crucial feature of rationality in performance, the feature of adapta-
tion, can be best explained by tracing it back to Gell-Mann who introduced the
term complex adaptive system for a system which is complex and capable of
changing and adapting to the environment [Gell-Mann 1994]. In this sense we
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can consider human beings as complex adaptive systems endowed with the ex-
traordinary ability of orienting themselves in complex surroundings. Rational
thinking in performance requires taking account of unpredictable events and
the necessity of re-orientation. In the meantime, the concept of adaptation
has become a focus of research in dierent disciplines and has been related to
the evolution of the brain, for instance, in the collective volume on Language
as a Complex Adaptive System [Ellis & Larsen-Freeman 2010].
Other neurobiological experiments on mirror neurons have, at least to some
degree, proved the observation that human beings are dialogically oriented
[Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998], [Weigand 2009a], [Iacoboni 2008]. As dialogic indi-
viduals we have to mediate between our self-interests and social concerns.
Proceeding in this way, combining goal-oriented observation with biolog-
ical verication, allows us to develop theories which demonstrate that the
humanities and the social sciences are interrelated with the natural sciences
on the basis of the unity of knowledge or consilience. If we want to structure
complexity or to nd out the laws of chaos, we need to take account of the
following basic conditions, cf. [Simon 1962]:
 The predication complex does not refer to linear enumeration and
addition of parts but to integration and interaction of components. The
whole is more than the sum of all the interactions carried out by the
components.
 The starting point needs to be the complex whole.
 The components are to be derived from the whole in a complex hierarchy.
Derivation means specialization or dierentiation, not division into parts
or arbitrarily picking out any aspect whatsoever. Integration is not
achieved by the addition of parts.
 Specialization cannot be arbitrary but needs to comply with rationality-
in-performance, i.e., to proceed step by step from one level to the next
within the complex hierarchy. Rational specialization presupposes near-
decomposability of the whole and its components. Otherwise there would
be no laws of complexity. The restriction of near-decomposability draws
on the basic rule of complexity which is a rule of probability. Adapting
to ever-changing conditions presupposes rational thinking which is pre-
pared to change direction and to include chance if necessary.
3 Nuts and bolts of a performance theory of
human action and behaviour
Let us now draw conclusions from the general structure of complexity to a
performance theory of human action and behaviour. A sine qua non will
be the direction these conclusions need to take, namely from the object to
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methodology. When trying to develop a holistic approach we rst need to
grasp our object of study and then derive an adequate methodology from it.
We should always be aware of the fact that our cognition is human cognition,
not an independent ability. We are therefore unable to grasp absolute truth;
we can only perceive and recognize as far as our abilities allow us to do.
Developing theories by including some level of truth-conditional semantics
represents an articial construction which reduces the object to methodology
and does not make sense in an advance in the complex.
3.1 The object of study
The rst question to be posed is related to our object-of-study. How can
we circumscribe our object human action and behaviour in a way that it
complies with recent results in neuroscience? Human action and behaviour are
determined by human abilities which are integrated abilities. On the basis of
the coevolution of genes, mind, and culture human abilities can be considered
to be rooted in human nature and to be inuenced by the environment and
culture. Coevolution tells us that this inuence not only occurs by learning but
is already guided by the genes by what is called prepared learning [Seligman
1970], [Wilson 2004, 65]. Prepared learning determines our view of the world
or what we are able to learn at all and as a result aects the genetic basis.
Lumsden & Wilson even speak of culturgens [Lumsden & Wilson 2005, Ixvi].
The thesis of the interaction or symbiosis between brain and culture is, for
instance, also supported by Merlin Donald [Donald 1991, 2001].
In order to detect how competence-in-performance works, we need a key
concept to open up the complex. What can count as the leading force in human
beings' actions and behaviour? From an evolutionary point of view human be-
ings are purposive beings by their very nature. It is human interests, needs
and desires which determine their action and behaviour. Human needs are
on the one hand needs to know, on the other hand needs to coordinate and
direct actions of others. With respect to survival needs, human beings want
to act successfully. By identifying an ability of rationality-in-performance we
presuppose purposive action guided by reason but open to chance and individ-
ual decisions. Rationality-in-performance as a human ability needs to comply
with the interaction of human nature, culture and the natural environment. I
can only mention a few essential features in this regard; for a more detailed
description you are referred to my recent books [Weigand 2010, 2009a].
Let us start with features rooted in human nature:
 Human abilities are integrated abilities.
 Human beings are purposive beings.
 Human beings are social individuals; their action and behaviour are
determined by a double interest: self-interest and social concerns.
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 Human beings are persuasive beings; they want to be accepted by their
fellow beings.
Persuasion is usually conceived of as belonging to rhetoric, cf., e.g.,
[Perelman 1977]. To consider human beings as persuasive beings means giving
up the traditional distinction between purely rational or necessary conditions
and argumentative or acceptable conditions, a distinction which in the end
relates to the distinction between absolute truth and truth from the perspec-
tive of the speaker. Rhetoric claims to describe eective language use, i.e.,
persuasive language use. What can count as eective or persuasive interaction
depends on individual evaluation. Persuasion is a mental perlocutionary pro-
cess; in the end, only the dialogue partners can tell us whether they have been
persuaded. Consequently, eectiveness is not completely calculable nor is it
rationally or conventionally achievable. Speakers try to be eective by means
of rhetorical strategies. Rhetoric in this sense is a matter of how to use the
means in performance, including what arguments to choose, i.e., a matter of
the speakers, not a matter of textual means as such.
Human nature is from the very outset inuenced by the environment.
Occasions and events change as time changes. Human beings need to adapt
to ever-varying action conditions. Their ability of rationality-in-performance
tells them how to proceed: they rst orient themselves according to regulari-
ties. If they cannot obtain a satisfying picture, they include particularities and
make individual inferences. In this way they are prepared to meet chance and
to change direction on the basis of principles of probability. They start from
standard cases based on rules and conventions and proceed to particular cases
by including individual, non-conventional features. Their way of addressing
complexity is a way determined by rationality-in-performance:
 Human beings adapt themselves to the ever-changing environment.
 Human beings start from standard cases and proceed to particular ones.
 Human beings derive subsystems by specialization.
To illustrate this procedure let us imagine that we are involved in complex
interactions, for instance, business interactions. We cannot clearly see what
is really going on because we cannot grasp all the relevant variables at once.
What are we doing? We pay attention to what seems especially crucial. We
tentatively identify some regular case. If this does not t actual performance,
we advance by tentatively bringing in particular, individual features and try
to reach understanding by inferences. There is no other way of orientation in
a world of uncertainties than on the basis of probabilities.
The third force which aects human action and behaviour is, of course,
culture. On the one hand, culture is manifest in the external environment as
customs and value systems. On the other hand, it has been internalized as cul-
turgens. Accepting the basis, we can derive the following basic feature which
aects human action and behaviour mostly unconsciously [Weigand 2007]:
 Human beings are cultural beings.
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3.2 Deriving methodology from the object
Having grasped our object competence-in-performance, of which rationality-
in-performance is an integrated crucial component, we can now derive method-




Figure 1: Constituents of a theory
In general, a theory is based on an object-of-study and an adequate
methodology. An object of performance which includes rules as well as in-
dividualities and chance can only be dealt with by principles of probability.
Even rules are subject to probability insofar as it is the individual human being
who decides whether to apply them or not.
Principles of probability do not mean axiomatic principles as Linell [Linell
2009, 11] and Rommetveit [Rommetveit 1990] use the term dialogical princi-
ples nor do they mean statistical probability. Statistics does not allow certain
conclusions about the individual case. Principles of probability, on the con-
trary, are techniques which allow human beings to estimate the individual
course of events with a certain degree of probability by reference to everyday
experience and special knowledge of the individual case.
When confronted with the complex, we are not the victims of chaos but
are able to master it. Endowed with rationality-in-performance we have an
extraordinary ability at our disposal, which is as simple as it is eective: we
focus attention on some subcomplex because the whole complex is beyond our
reach. We then proceed from standard cases based on regularities to particular
ones by taking account of individual features.
Regularities are of dierent kinds: they can be causal rules as in natural
sciences or coded rules as in structural linguistics; they can also be conventions
of use. Rules are features of the object, independent of the user, whereas
conventions are dependent on user groups. Conventions can become norms
if they are considered the proper manner of behaviour we should conform
to. In contrast to conventions, norms cannot count as communicative means.
There are, for instance, conventions of so-called civilized behaviour, such as
avoiding insinuations, which are expected in public or institutionalized games.
The interlocutors are, in principle, free to conform to them. Their behaviour
can however be evaluated by observers according to normative benchmarks (for
an authentic example see [Weigand 2008, 15]). Norms are thus a culturally
dependent benchmark of behaviour which are to be included in the description
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without changing the descriptive theory to a normative one. Even strictly
grammatical norms might be disregarded by the user as is, for instance, the
case in chat communication. In the end, it is always individual human beings
who decide whether to conform to norms or not.
I will demonstrate by a few introductory examples how principles of prob-
ability can be rationally derived from the premises about the object. Rational
derivation in this respect means that the object is characterized by certain
features which determine the way it works. I need to restrict myself to the
procedure in general. Basically, there are three types of principles: constitu-
tive, regulative and executive ones. Constitutive principles are principles that
constitute dialogic action in its fundamentals. Constitutive in this sense are
the principles of action, of dialogue and of coherence. Regulative principles
come to work on the basis of constitutive principles. They regulate the inter-
action of subsystems which can turn out to be in opposition to each other.
Regulative are the principles of politeness versus self-interest and of reason
versus emotion. Reason is always more or less aected by emotion as has -
nally been proved by neuroscience. Executive principles guide the dynamics
of the dialogic process. The principles of sequencing and of strategic use are
executive. Strategies of successful action depend on cultural conventions and
on certain ideologies in the background. The Maxim of Clarity, introduced by
Grice, might be successful in science but is certainly not a general strategy of
language use [Grice 1975].
Let us start with the Action Principle. If human beings are goal-directed
beings, the theory needs an action-theoretic basis:
goals and purposes as driving force → Action Principle
Figure 2: Deriving the Action Principle
If human beings are social individuals, their communicative actions will al-
ways be dialogically oriented, either as initiative actions which make a dialogic
claim or as reactions which are expected to full this very claim:
human beings as social individuals → Dialogic Principle proper
Figure 3: Deriving the Dialogic Principle proper
From the premise that human abilities are integrated abilities or abili-
ties in interaction, the conclusion to be drawn is that there is no such thing
as language as such. The ability to speak interacts with other abilities.
Consequently, coherence can no longer be a matter of the verbal text alone
but is ultimately established in the minds of the interlocutors:
The Principle of Coherence is crucial for the use of dierent communicative
means. If human beings are persuasive beings, any communicative means they
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interaction of abilities → Coherence Principle:
verbal, perceptual, cognitive means in
integration
Figure 4: Deriving the Principle of Coherence
use will in the end be used in order to be accepted by the community or to be
more or less successful in their aairs. Consequently, rhetoric can no longer be
a separate domain in describing performance; any means, any technique and
strategy is used more or less persuasively:
human beings as → dialogic means as rhetorical means in general
persuasive beings no separation between grammar and rhetoric
Figure 5: Consequences for rhetoric
Constitutive principles are accompanied by regulative and executive prin-
ciples which are also derived from the premises. If human beings are social
individuals, they have to regulate their self-interest and social concerns by
means of principles of politeness. Politeness can mean respect for the other
human being or can be used in the self-interest of the speaker in order to make
things easier:
human beings as social → Regulative Principles
individuals of Politeness
Figure 6: Regulating self-interest and social concerns
When human abilities interact, regulative principles are also needed to
mediate between abilities which may turn out to be in opposition to each
other, such as reason and emotion. Principles of Emotion mostly represent
cultural expectations or conventions and are often expressed as normative
maxims which tell us how to deal with emotions in dialogue:
human abilities as integrated → Regulative Principles
abilities of Emotion
Figure 7: Regulating emotion and reason
If human beings are cultural beings, culture can no longer be an addi-
tional component but will be basic everywhere in human action and behaviour.
Culture is manifest from the very beginning in shaping the image of the in-
dividual human beings and their relationship to the community. Regulative
Principles of politeness and emotion are therefore in general culturally shaped:
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human beings as cultural beings → culturally shaped
Regulative Principles
Figure 8: The inuence of culture
If human beings are goal-directed beings, they need principles of how to
proceed in complex dialogues or of how to execute the sequencing of actions
in order to be successful. Such Executive Principles guide the follow-up of
actions and reactions in extended dialogues:
human beings as → Executive Principles
goal-directed beings in extended dialogue
Figure 9: Strategic Principles
Executive Principles can take the form of strategies which are clearly di-
rected towards eective language use or towards being successful in the process
of negotiation.
4 From rationality of logic to rationality-in-
life
Having sketched some overall conclusions which can be rationally drawn from
the premises and which elucidate how human beings proceed in dialogic in-
teraction on the basis of our competence-in-performance, let us now try to
clarify more precisely what rationality-in-performance means and how it can
be dierentiated.
Rationality is not an object but characterizes a conclusion. Conclusions
have a starting point and follow certain criteria in order to arrive at the in-
tended result. The starting point and the criteria can be very dierent de-
pending on dierent concepts of conclusion. To my mind, there are, on the
one hand, criteria which are independent of the situation of use and, on the
other hand, criteria dependent on use. Independent criteria constitute arti-
cial systems, criteria dependent on use constitute natural phenomena. Even
if articial systems are created by human beings in an attempt to bring order
in natural disorder, their functioning is independent of human beings. The
articial system, for instance, of classical mathematics or chess, is object and
methodology at the same time. As articial systems they do not relate to
reality at all. If we take the laws of physics as eternal laws, they are not the
laws of nature. If we take the rules of logic or chess as rules of language games,
we are dealing with articial games. As soon as we try to nd the proper laws
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of nature or of language use, we have to acknowledge the basic rule of perfor-
mance which is a rule of probability. The change from certainty to probability
has brought about the change from classical physics to quantum physics. We
should however be aware of the fact that even quantum physics remains a
physics within the limits of human cognition, despite dierent comments by
inuential physicists like Hawking, e.g., [Hawking 1988, 193].
Recognizing that performance is based on probability does not mean that
we can do nothing else than guessing. Probability of life does not mean that
we can only rely on statistical probability and thus remain in ignorance about
our individual case. Human beings want a guideline for their own individual
action. Rationality in life is based on reasonable expectancy in the individual
case.
We can thus distinguish between rationality of articial systems and
rationality-in-life:
conclusions









dependent on human beings
changing in time
Figure 10: Certainty of logic versus expectancy in life
This two-part distinction between logic and life, between general rules and
individual expectancy needs to be dierentiated in order to include the area
of conventions. Conventions are not general in the sense of independent rules
insofar as they are introduced by and valid for certain groups, nations, or cul-
tures. Theories of competence deal with conventions as they deal with rules,
i.e., on a general basis, independent of individual decisions. Conventions, in
this sense, only allow us to choose between general, predetermined possibili-
ties [Lewis 1969]. Pragmatic theories introduced the concept of individuality,
mostly however inconsistently by adding together two systems, the system of
signs and the system of inferences, which are incompatible with each other.
Coherence in individual language use does not come about by adding together
two systems but is established by the interlocutors in their minds. Rationality-
in-performance is not an ability of a system but a human ability. Human beings
apply rules and conventions as far as they seem appropriate or acceptable to
them. In this sense, rules and conventions in performance are dependent on
probability decisions by individuals.
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There are obviously dierent degrees of probability, ranging from high
to low. We can expect with high probability that speakers comply with the
grammatical rules of their mother tongue, with less probability that they com-
ply with cultural conventions, for instance, conventions of civilized behaviour.
Cases of low probability are based on individual conclusions in particular
games and are open to misunderstanding. Including individuality does not
mean guessing or trial and error. It is guided by expectancy based on the
knowledge of particularities of the individual case.
Probability concepts such as habits and preferences play an important
role in human competence-in-performance. They are very often the key to
rationality in performance. We have certain assumptions about the preferences
of our interlocutors which aect our conclusions even if we are not aware of
them. Preferences are by their very nature valid in the majority of cases,
but not in all cases. They therefore cannot be predicted with certainty. The
same is true of the concept of habits. We take certain habits for granted,
but habits like preferences can change in particular cases. We can distinguish
between conventional habits and preferences of social communities and non-
conventional habits and preferences of individual human beings. The scope
of rationality concepts as applied in dierent models thus ranges from strict
























Figure 11: Types of rationality
Logic and theories of competence do not include individuality. Pragmatic
theories, as far as they are based on the adding together of dierent method-
ologies, rest on an inconsistent basis. Consistency is achieved by starting from
the human mind and from the integration of human abilities as included in
the Principle of Coherence in a theory of competence-in-performance.
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5 Examples of rationality in performance
Let us now analyse a few examples which demonstrate how human beings
as cultural, dialogic and adaptive beings meet the challenge of performance
by rationality-in-performance. Rationality-in-performance or practical reason
is an integrated part of our actions and behaviour insofar as human beings
as purposive beings try to achieve their goals more or less successfully. The
analysis focuses on how the Principle of Coherence works. This can also be
interesting for Articial Intelligence and the issue of how far computers could
possibly tackle indeterminacy of meaning and reference to common and indi-
vidual habits.
5.1 Rationality of high probability
Let me start with examples which demonstrate rational conclusions of high
probability:
(1) It's draughty. I'll close the window.
The predication that it is draughty inherently carries a negative evaluation,
at least in normal circumstances. With high probability it will trigger o a
reaction as in our example. If we mark the lexical items as [± positive], the
conclusion should be possible also for computers: Of course, even conclusions
draughtynegative → bring to an end
Figure 12: Inherent conclusiveness
of inherent conclusiveness will, in principle, remain open under conditions of
performance.
5.2 Rationality of general habits
Let us now focus on a very interesting case which demonstrates how language
use and general habits of life or preferences are entwined. I will take the
well-known example from Brown and Yule [Brown & Yule 1983]
(2) The doorbell is ringing.I'm in the bath.
The occurrence that the doorbell is ringing usually means that someone
is standing at the door and wants the door to be opened. In the same way
being in the bath is connected with the habit of not being prepared to appear
in public. These habits need not be expressed explicitly; we rely on our mutual
knowledge of habits in our social community. In this way, we usually mean
more than we say by means of the integrated use of dierent communicative
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means: speaking and thinking. What is true for the individual utterances,
the initiative as well as the reactive, is also true for their connection in the
sequence: we need not resign by assuming a zero connector [Stati 1994], but
can very precisely indicate how they are connected, namely by the Dialogical
Principle proper, which determines the reactive action as an action that can
be expected through the initiative claim, in our case the indirect claim to open
the door: If I am in the bathroom I am not prepared to open the door. It
is the rational structure of the initiative speech act which determines what
reaction is expected.
What I called reference to habits is usually dealt with as encyclopaedic
knowledge or knowledge of the world and added as a separate component to
the verbal component. Yet what is world knowledge? It is what we believe
to know of and think about the world. Language is used in the stream of
life [Wittgenstein 1981], i.e., on the basis of what we believe to know about
everyday habits. There is no independent world knowledge, no need to list it
by enumerating items of encyclopaedic knowledge as is, for instance, done by
frame semantics.
Now let us see how we could formalize these conclusions based on general
habits. Where do they start from? The pivot seems to be the lexicon. It
is the lexical phrase to ring the doorbell that initiates the inference to open
the door, and it is the lexical phrase being in the bathroom that initiates the
inference to not being prepared to appear in public. If we could include these
habits in the lexical description, it would be possible even for a machine to
connect both utterances by rational probability conclusions and arrive at the
conclusion that I am in the bathroom indirectly expresses a refusal to open the
door. The lexicon entries could be represented as follows:
ring indirect
[ringing (doorbell)] → [open the door]
reason conclusion
bathroom
[being (in the bathroom)] → [unable to appear in public/
unable to open the door]
reason conclusion
Figure 13: The lexicon and its role in the process of inferencing
Coherence is thus achieved in the following rational way that brings nego-
tiation down to patterns of probability (see Figure 14).
Rationality in this sense means practical reasoning based on probability
and accepting a certain indeterminacy. If the lexical items which I consider to
be phrases [Weigand 1998] are annotated in this way, i.e., indicate presumable
relationships between events of human life, it will be possible even for machines
to trigger o these sequences and make machines think along the lines of
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The doorbell is ringing  I am in the bathroom
sentence type [declarative sentence] [declarative sentence]








Dialogic Principle directive ↔ consentnegative
↓
Coherence
Figure 14: Coherence on the basis of probability
probability [Weigand 2009b]. It becomes evident that the lexicon cannot be
dealt with as an independent part of utterance grammar. On the contrary, the
lexicon turns out to be the crucial connecting point of predication and action.
What I demonstrated with respect to lexical units such as ringing the
doorbell or being in the bathroom is also true of many other lexical units such
as to wait, being late, etc., as can be seen in the following examples which are
very similar to example (2):
(3) It's late.We're going soon.
(4) Doris is waiting at the airport.I'll fetch her.
Examples like these demonstrate that indirect speech acts very often bear
on their lexical items even if the conclusion to be drawn from the use of the
lexical item is left to the interlocutor. The issue of the lexicon should therefore
be completely revised. Probability concepts such as habits, preferences and
evaluations enter the lexicon if it is conceived of as an integrated part of a
dialogic utterance grammar.
In contrast to such a conception of the lexicon which goes beyond xed
patterns, formal semantics, e.g., Pustejovsky [Pustejovsky 1995] or Mel'£uk &
Wanner [Mel'£uk & Wanner 1994], start from the premise that the meaning
of words can be described in a completely rule-governed way and that units
of more than one word can be derived from the meaning of individual words.
But in doing so Mel'£uk and Wanner are clearly aware of the fact that they
can only describe a small part of the vocabulary using such a rule-governed
technique. While Pustejovsky does not acknowledge the methodological fallacy
he is a victim of, Mel'£uk and Wanner nally recognize that the capricious
nature of natural language cannot be grasped using a rule-governed model.
If we look for an algorithm we arrive at a point where we have to admit like
Teubert: Something must be wrong, however [Teubert 1996, 225] and where
we necessarily come to the conclusion: It may well be that we will have to
recognize that there are neither obvious regularities nor applicable rules.
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The diculties formal approaches run into if they do not accept probability
conditions demonstrate once again that we, unlike Sinclair [Sinclair 1994],
cannot trust the text because the verbal text is only a component in the
mixed game. Human beings are adaptive beings who normally do not make
a distinction between text and context, between acting and interpreting, but
interact in the action game by integratively accounting for variables of dierent
types. They cannot proceed otherwise even if they wanted to.
5.3 Rationality of low probability
Let us now analyse an example of rationality of low probability. Such ex-
amples are often the source of misunderstandings because they bear on the
uncertainty of actual habits and preferences. Typical examples of this type
are the following authentic examples:
(5) You are playing the piano again.
(6) You are playing Game Boy again.
How to deal with the meaning of such utterances in Articial Intelligence?
Obviously certain declarative sentences can imply positive or negative evalu-
ations and in dependence trigger o certain reactions. The conclusions to be
drawn from what is said to what is meant need to take account of individual
preferences.
In our examples a statement is made verbally, no evaluation is expressed.
At least for example (6) or for playing Game Boy, there is no generally agreed
upon cultural evaluation. Some parents might be pleased to see their child
engaged in what they consider an intellectual activity, others might be annoyed
by what seems to have become a never-ending activity. For example (5) or
for playing the piano, we could assume a positive cultural evaluation which
however does not have to be valid in the actual case. The interlocutor, who
is playing the piano, tries to make sense of the utterance rst by applying
rules: the utterance is a declarative sentence, in the indicative present tense,
therefore a speech act of a statement. But why is this statement made? Why
has attention been focused on my playing the piano? In some cases, intonation
is a valid device; in other cases, however, it does not provide a clear cue. In our
authentic example, the intonation is not distinctive in expressing whether the
statement is accompanied by satisfaction or anger. So far the rules have come
to their limits. The interlocutor has to adapt to the particular situation and to
look for individual features. What has been said and what can be perceived,
for instance, the facial expression of the speaker, has to be combined with
cognitive means or inferences which depend on knowledge of the particular
situation. Even if the interlocutors know each other well, there will always
remain a certain leeway of uncertainty due to chance and the actual mood of
the speaker. As there is no verbal context, in the end, only the speaker can
know with certainty how the utterance is meant.
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Human beings do not immediately give up in such cases but go beyond
rules and try to nd some guideline by reecting on what probably is the case.
Thus the child playing the piano might know that her mother at the time of
the utterance is usually involved in work connected with her job and needs
silence. She will therefore probably take the utterance you are playing the
piano again as a reproach:
(7) A. You are playing the piano again.
B. Shall I stop it?
A. No, it is o.k. I am going to work outside.
In adapting to the complex she starts with her mother's habitual preference
whichbeing a concept of probabilityis not a secure guide and, in our case,
leads to misunderstanding. Misunderstandings can be accepted as they are
usually corrected immediately as in our example.
To sum up: The examples analysed demonstrate the complex balance
of parameters in performance and how this balance can be managed by
rationality-in-performance. Human performance is dialogic performance based
on the relation of expectancy between action and reaction as expressed by the
general Dialogic Principle proper. Expectancy primarily draws on the rational
structure of the initiative speech act. With the initiative action the speaker
makes a pragmatic claim to truth or to volition and can expect that their
very claim is fullled by the interlocutor's reaction, positively or negatively.
By rationally dierentiating the pragmatic claim of the initiative speech act
a comprehensive dialogic speech act taxonomy can be derived. Whereas the
Dialogic Principle proper regulates the functional sequence of actions, the
Coherence Principle is constitutive for the correlation between what is said
and what is meant.
To my mind, even computers could be programmed in such a way as to
be capable of tackling the balance of probabilities in performance, at least to
some extent. However, we have to leave behind us orthodox concepts of signs
and dened meaning and start from larger units, primarily the dialogically
oriented utterance.
6 Outlook
If we want to grasp rationality-in-performance we need to go beyond classical
concepts of strict rationality and address the integrated whole of human action
and behaviour. There is no language as such, no cognition or perception as
such, there are human beings who act and react as dialogic individuals. They
have needs and interests and are endowed with extraordinary abilities which
allow them to come to grips with the vicissitudes of life.
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If science is to contribute to the benet of the human species, we need to go
beyond disciplinary boundaries and dare the adventure of a holistic approach.
Les lois du chaos are not general or autonomous rules, but rules which
mediate between order and disorder, between the general and the particular.
Progress in science cannot be set back. We are on the way towards the unity
of knowledge or consilience of dierent disciplines, from the natural sciences
to the social sciences and the humanities. It is human beings, their biology
and social abilities, which have to be investigated in an integrated manner.
We need to free ourselves from methodological exigencies of the past, inherited
since antiquity. Theorizing needs to be changed from classical theorizing based
on reductionism to modern theorizing based on the rationality of the complex
whole.
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